Three Laws Blog: Law and Artificial Intelligence

Harned and Wallach on Stretching Human Laws to Apply to Machines: The Dangers of a "Colorblind" Computer @ZachHarned @StanfordLaw @hannawallach

Zach Harned, Stanford Law School, and Hanna Wallach, Microsoft Research, New York City, are publishing Stretching Human Laws to Apply to Machines: The Dangers of a 'Colorblind' Computer in Florida State University Law Review. Here is the abstract.

Automated decision making has become widespread in recent years, largely due to advances in machine learning. As a result of this trend, machine learning systems are increasingly used to make decisions in high-stakes domains, such as employment or university admissions. The weightiness of these decisions has prompted the realization that, like humans, machines must also comply with the law. But human decision-making processes are quite different from automated decision-making processes, which creates a mismatch between laws and the decision makers to which they are intended to apply. In turn, this mismatch can lead to counterproductive outcomes. We take antidiscrimination laws in employment as a case study, with a particular focus on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. A common strategy for mitigating bias in employment decisions is to “blind” human decision makers to the sensitive attributes of the applicants, such as race. The same strategy can also be used in an automated decision-making context by blinding the machine learning system to the race of the applicants (strategy 1). This strategy seems to comply with Title VII, but it does not necessarily mitigate bias because machine learning systems are adroit at using proxies for race if available. An alternative strategy is to not blind the system to race (strategy 2), thereby allowing it to use this information to mitigate bias. However, although preferable from a machine learning perspective, this strategy appears to violate Title VII. We contend that this conflict between strategies 1 and 2 highlights a broader legal and policy challenge, namely, that laws designed to regulate human behavior may not be appropriate when stretched to apply to machines. Indeed, they may even be detrimental to the very people that they were designed to protect. Although scholars have explored legal arguments in an attempt to press strategy 2 into compliance with Title VII, we believe there lies a middle ground between strategies 1 and 2 that involves partial blinding—that is, blinding the system to race only during deployment and not during training (strategy 3). We present strategy 3 as a “Goldilocks” solution for discrimination in employment decisions (as well as other domains), because it allows for the mitigation of bias while still complying with Title VII. Ultimately, any solution to the general problem of stretching human laws to apply to machines must be sociotechnical in nature, drawing on work in both machine learning and the law. This is borne out in strategy 3, which involves innovative work in machine learning (viz. the development of disparate learning processes) and creative legal analysis (viz. analogizing strategy 3 to legally accepted auditing procedures).

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

Puaschunder on Artificial Intelligence's Razor's Edge: On the Future of Democracy and Society in the Artificial Age

Julia M. Puaschunder, Harvard University; The New School for Social Research; Columbia University; Princeton University; George Washington University Center for International Business Education and Research; The New School--Bernard Schwartz Center for Economic Policy Analysis, has published On Artificial Intelligence’s Razor’s Edge: On the Future of Democracy and Society in the Artificial Age in the RAIS Conference Proceedings - The 12th International RAIS Conference on Social Sciences & Humanities. Here is the abstract.

The introduction of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in our contemporary society imposes historically unique challenges for humankind. The emerging autonomy of AI holds unique potentials of eternal life of robots, AI and algorithms alongside unprecedented economic superiority, data storage and computational advantages. However, the introduction of AI to society also raises ethical questions. What is the social impact of robots, algorithms, blockchain and AI entering the workforce and our daily lives on the economy and human society? Should AI become eternal or is there a virtue in switching off AI at a certain point? If so, we may have to define a ‘virtue of killing’ and a ‘right to destroy’ that may draw from legal but also philosophical sources to answer the question how to handle the abyss of killing with ethical grace and fair style. In light of robots already having gained citizenship and being attributed as quasi-human under Common Law jurisdiction, should AI and robots be granted full citizen rights – such as voting rights? Or should we simply reap the benefits of AI and consider to define a democracy with different classes having diversified access to public choice and voting – as practiced in the ancient Athenian city state, which became the cradle of Western civilization and democratic traditions spread around the globe. Or should we legally justify AI slaves to economically reap their benefits, as was common in ancient Rome, which became the Roman Law legal foundation for Continental and some of Scandinavian Law traditions and which inspired very many different codifications around the world. Finally, we may also draw from the Code Napoléon, the French Code Civil established under Napoleon in 1804, which defined male and female into two classes of human with substantial right and power differences, and – to this day – accounts for one of the few documents that have influenced the whole world in legal and societal ways. In asking critical questions and unraveling the ethical boundary conditions of our future artificial world, the paper thereby takes a descriptive – afar from normative – theoretical angle targeted at aiding a successful introduction of AI into our contemporary workforce, democracy and society.

Download the paper from SSRN at the link.

Nemitz on Constitutional Democracy and Technology in the Age of AI @PaulNemitz

Paul Nemitz, European Commission; College of Europe, Brugge, has published Constitutional Democracy and Technology in the age of Artificial Intelligence at DOI 10.1098/RSTA.2018.0089 - Royal Society Philosophical Transactions A. Here is the abstract.

Given the foreseeable pervasiveness of Artificial Intelligence in modern societies, it is legitimate and necessary to ask the question how this new technology must be shaped to support the maintenance and strengthening of constitutional democracy. This paper first describes the four core elements of today's digital power concentration, which need to be seen in cumulation and which, seen together, are both a threat to democracy and to functioning markets. It then recalls the experience with the lawless internet and the relationship between technology and the law as it has developed in the internet economy and the experience with GDPR before it moves on to the key question for AI in democracy, namely which of the challenges of AI can be safely and with good conscience left to ethics, and which challenges of AI need to be addressed by rules which are enforceable and encompass the legitimacy of democratic process, thus laws. The paper closes with a call for a new culture of incorporating the principles of Democracy, Rule of law and Human Rights by design in AI and a three level technological impact assessment for new technologies like AI as a practical way forward for this purpose.

Download the paper from SSRN at the link.

Thierer, Castillo, and Russell on Artificial Intelligence and Public Policy @AdamThierer @GeorgeMasonU @mercatus

Adam D. Thierer, Andrea Castillo, and Raymond Russell, all of the Mercatus Center, George Mason University, have published Artificial Intelligence and Public Policy. Here is the abstract.

There is growing interest in the market potential of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies and applications as well as in the potential risks that these technologies might pose. As a result, questions are being raised about the legal and regulatory governance of AI, machine learning, “autonomous” systems, and related robotic and data technologies. Fearing concerns about labor market effects, social inequality, and even physical harm, some have called for precautionary regulations that could have the effect of limiting AI development and deployment. In this paper, we recommend a different policy framework for AI technologies. At this nascent stage of AI technology development, we think a better case can be made for prudence, patience, and a continuing embrace of “permissionless innovation” as it pertains to modern digital technologies. Unless a compelling case can be made that a new invention will bring serious harm to society, innovation should be allowed to continue unabated, and problems, if they develop at all, can be addressed later.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

The AI/Artificial Intelligence For Good: AI's 21st Century Challenges

Catherine Saez of Intellectual Property Watch writes about the AI/Artificial Intelligence for Good Global Summit (June 7-9, 2017). She notes that among the issues discussed were the potential of AI to make decisions on its own, the new European Parliament resolution calling for consideration of legal and ethical implications of robotics, and the rapid expansion of tasks that AI does without human intervention. 

Cohen on Affording Fundamental Rights: A Review Essay of Mireille Hildebrandt's Smart Technologies and the End(s) of Law @mireillemoret

Julie E. Cohen, Georgetown University Law Center, is publishing Affording Fundamental Rights in volume 4 of Critical Analysis of Law (2017). Here is the abstract.

Mireille Hildebrandt’s Smart Technologies and the End(s) of Law (2015) raises questions for law that are best characterized as meta-institutional. This review essay considers the implications of Hildebrandt’s work for the conceptualization of fundamental rights. One consequence of the shift to a world in which smart digital technologies continually, immanently mediate and preempt our beliefs and choices is that legal discourses about fundamental rights are revealed to be incomplete along a dimension that we have simply failed to recognize. To remain effective in the digital age, rights discourse requires extension into the register of affordances.

Download the review essay from SSRN at the link.

Cath, Watchter, Mittelstadt, Taddeo, and Floridi on Artificial Intelligence and the "Good Society": The US, EU, and UK Approach @C_Cath @SandraWachter5 @floridi @b_mittelstadt

Corinne J. N. Cath, Sandra Wachter, Brent Mittelstadt, Mariarosaria Taddeo, and Luciano Floridi, all of the Oxford University Oxford Internet Institute, have published Artificial Intelligence and the 'Good Society': The US, EU, and UK Approach. Here is the abstract.

In October 2016, the White House, the European Parliament, and the UK House of Commons each issued a report outlining their visions on how to prepare society for the widespread use of AI. In this article, we provide a comparative assessment of these three reports in order to facilitate the design of policies favourable to the development of a ‘good AI society’. To do so, we examine how each report addresses the following three topics: (a) the development of a ‘good AI society’; (b) the role and responsibility of the government, the private sector, and the research community (including academia) in pursuing such a development; and (c) where the recommendations to support such a development may be in need of improvement. Our analysis concludes that the reports address adequately various ethical, social, and economic topics, but come short of providing an overarching political vision and long-term strategy for the development of a ‘good AI society’. In order to contribute to fill this gap, in the conclusion we suggest a two-pronged approach.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

Burri on The Politics of Robot Autonomy @HSGStGallen

Thomas Burri, University of St. Gallen, has published The Politics of Robot Autonomy at 7 European Journal of Risk Regulation 341 (2016). Here is the abstract.

The autonomy robots enjoy is understood in different ways. On the one hand, a technical understanding of autonomy is firmly anchored in the present and concerned with what can be achieved now by means of code and programming; on the other hand, a philosophical understanding of robot autonomy looks into the future and tries to anticipate how robots will evolve in the years to come. The two understandings are at odds at times, occasionally they even clash. However, not one of them is necessarily truer than the other. Each is driven by certain real-life factors; each rests on its own justification. This article discusses these two “views of robot autonomy” in depth and witnesses them at work at two of the most relevant events of robotics in recent times, namely the Darpa Robotics Challenge, which took place in California in June 2015, and the ongoing process to address lethal autonomous weapons in humanitarian Geneva, which is spurred on by a “Campaign to Stop Killer Robots”. Notes: This article was published in June 2016 in (7) European Journal of Risk Regulation (2) pp. 341-360 as part of a special issue including five articles on "The Man and the Machine: When Systems Take Decisions Autonomously", edited by Thomas Burri and Isabelle Wildhaber; the authors of the other articles are Shawn Bayern, Madeleine de Cock Buning, Ugo Pagallo/Massimo Durante, and Melinda Florina Lohmann.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

Mehlman, Berg, and Roy on Robot Law @CWRU_Law

Maxwell Mehlman and Jessica Wilen Berg, of CWRU School of Law, and Soumya Ray, of CWRU Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, have published Robot Law. Here is the abstract.

Recent advances in artificially-intelligent robotics have prompted calls for expansion of research on how to prevent artificial intelligence systems from harming humans. A primary means of protecting humans from harm caused by other humans is the reciprocal system of rights and obligations known as law. This article discusses the prospects that future AI systems will be capable of purposefully harming humans, and if so, proposes that a similar reciprocal system be developed to govern relationships between those AI systems and humans.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

Balkin on The Three Laws of Robotics in the Age of Big Data @jackbalkin

Jack M. Balkin, Yale University Law School, is publishing The Three Laws of Robotics in the Age of Big Data in volume 78 of the Ohio State Law Journal (2017). Here is the abstract.

In his short stories and novels, Isaac Asimov imagined three law of robotics programmed into every robot. In our world, the "laws of robotics" are the legal and policy principles that should govern how human beings use robots, algorithms, and artificial intelligence agents. This essay introduces these basic legal principles using four key ideas: (1) the homunculus fallacy; (2) the substitution effect; (3) the concept of information fiduciaries; and (4) the idea of algorithmic nuisance. The homunculus fallacy is the attribution of human intention and agency to robots and algorithms. It is the false belief there is a little person inside the robot or program who has good or bad intentions. The substitution effect refers to the multiple effects on social power and social relations that arise from the fact that robots, AI agents, and algorithms substitute for human beings and operate as special-purpose people. The most important issues in the law of robotics require us to understand how human beings exercise power over other human beings mediated through new technologies. The "three laws of robotics" for our Algorithmic Society, in other words, should be laws directed at human beings and human organizations, not at robots themselves. Behind robots, artificial intelligence agents and algorithms are governments and businesses organized and staffed by human beings. A characteristic feature of the Algorithmic Society is that new technologies permit both public and private organizations to govern large populations. In addition, the Algorithmic Society also features significant asymmetries of information, monitoring capacity, and computational power between those who govern others with technology and those who are governed. With this in mind, we can state three basic "laws of robotics" for the Algorithmic Society: First, operators of robots, algorithms and artificial intelligence agents are information fiduciaries who have special duties of good faith and fair dealing toward their end-users, clients and customers. Second, privately owned businesses who are not information fiduciaries nevertheless have duties toward the general public. Third, the central public duty of those who use robots, algorithms and artificial intelligence agents is not to be algorithmic nuisances. Businesses and organizations may not leverage asymmetries of information, monitoring capacity, and computational power to externalize the costs of their activities onto the general public. The term "algorithmic nuisance" captures the idea that the best analogy for the harms of algorithmic decision making is not intentional discrimination but socially unjustified "pollution" - that is, using computational power to make others pay for the costs of one's activities. Obligations of transparency, due process and accountability flow from these three substantive requirements. Transparency - and its cousins, accountability and due process - apply in different ways with respect to all three principles. Transparency and/or accountability may be an obligation of fiduciary relations, they may follow from public duties, and they may be a prophylactic measure designed to prevent unjustified externalization of harms or in order to provide a remedy for harm.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.