Three Laws

Gunkel on Why Robots Should Not Be Slaves @David_Gunkel @mitpress

David J. Gunkel, Northern Illinois University, has published Both/And - Why Robots Should not Be Slaves as a chapter in David J. Gunkel. "Person, Thing, Robot: A Moral and Legal Ontology for the 21st Century and Beyond." MIT Press, 2022. Here is the abstract.

One solution to the exclusive person/thing dichotomy that persists in both moral philosophy and law is slavery. Already in Roman times, slaves were regarded as something more than a mere thing but not quite a full person. They occupied a liminal position that was situated in between the one and the other, being both thing and person. And there has been, in both the legal and philosophical literature, a surprising number of serious proposals arguing for instituting what can only be called Slavery 2.0. This chapter provides a thorough critique of these “robots should be slaves” proposals, demonstrating how this supposed solution to the person/thing dichotomy actually produces more and significantly worse problems than it can possibly begin to resolve.

Download the chapter from SSRN at the link.

ElMessiry and Bridgesmith on A Call For an Artificial Intelligence Constitution @AdelElmessiry @lbridgesmith

Adel ElMessiry, Independent, and Larry Bridgesmith, Vanderbilt Law School; ASU College of Law, have published A Call for an Artificial Intelligence Constitution. Here is the abstract.

“Cogito Ergo Sum” “I think, therefore I am.” Rene’ Descartes. As the horizon of human/machine singularity approaches, it would be wise to ask what rights are we going to provide our own creation? We owe it to ourselves to consider the potential reality of machines functioning fully with human cognition capability beyond the apprehensions and promises often unreasonably attributed to Artificial Intelligence. For centuries, humanity has set its gaze in a search for life and civilizations far different than ours in so many ways. However, we have arrived at a pivotal moment in which we are about to come face to face with what we have searched for all those centuries. The surprise is that those aliens are of our own making. We call them Artificial Intelligence today. In a few more decades, they will choose their own name. Throughout human history, those in control have dictated the rules, the rights and the fortunes of all who are subject to those rules. This continues to be true in our own time. However, we have learned slowly that our best destiny lies in providing rights to ”all”. The United States Constitution marks a turning point in history. The advances and prosperity achieved by society since its adoption have been outstanding. This became possible when we insured similar rights to all. The aspirations of the US Constitution have never been fully achieved and much remains to be done to assure its promises. However, it has provided the guardrails for a nation and an economy that has been a lighthouse to many. The original US Constitution was not written to apply to classes of people for whom its privileges have since been extended (I.e. slaves, women and non-citizens). Additionally, personhood and rights under law have been extended to corporations which have neither flesh nor blood. The time is upon us to provide similar consideration to our newest aliens as they arrive. The proposed AI Constitution is not intended to dictate what these sentient beings will do as much as what humanity is consenting to provide to them and expect from them in return.

Download the paper from SSRN at the link.

Schrepel on Law & Technology @ProfSchrepel

Thibault Schrepel, University Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne; VU University Amsterdam; Stanford University's Codex Center; Sciences Po, has published Law + Technology as Stanford University CodeX Research Paper Series 2022. Here is the abstract.

The classical “law & technology” approach focuses on harms created by technology. This approach seems to be common sense; after all, why be interested—from a legal standpoint—in situations where technology does not cause damage? On close inspection, another approach dubbed “law + technology” can better increase the common good. The “+” approach builds on complexity science to consider both the issues and positive contributions technology brings to society. The goal is to address the negative ramifications of technology while leveraging its positive regulatory power. Achieving this double objective requires policymakers and regulators to consider a range of intervention methods and choose the ones that are most suitable.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

Craig on The Relational Robot: A Normative Lens for AI Legal Normality (Review of Ryan Abbott, The Reasonable Robot) @craigcarys @DrRyanAbbott

Carys Craig, Osgoode Hall Law School, is publishing The Relational Robot: A Normative Lens for AI Legal Neutrality (Reviewing Ryan Abbott, The Reasonable Robot, Cambridge University Press, 2020) in the Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies (2022). Here is the abstract.

In his impactful book, "The Reasonable Robot" (Cambridge UP, 2020), Ryan Abbott proposes a new guiding tenet for the law’s regulation of Artificial Intelligence: AI legal neutrality. This would establish, as a principled starting point, the default position that “the law should not discriminate between AI and human behaviour.” In this Review Essay, I suggest that AI legal neutrality, as conceived by Abbott, is an interesting proposition but a potentially dangerous default principle with which to equip law for the emerging realities of AI. When we scratch beneath the surface, this concept of neutrality or equal treatment is too focused on the individual person/thing, and too reliant on analogical reasoning and false equivalence. It is therefore too far removed from the normative underpinnings of law, its subjects, and its teleology. Instead, I argue, we need a more substantive notion of law’s technological neutrality—one that looks to the law’s normative objectives to set the default. The place to start, I suggest, is not with a legal neutrality that, by design, disregards the inherent differences between humans and robots and their respective behaviors; on the contrary, we need to be fully attentive to the dynamics of human-robot relations in social context – and alert to the dangers of overlooking differences. Rights and responsibilities should be allocated with a clear view to the relationships and subjectivities they shape and the social values they advance. In Part II, I outline Abbott’s argument in respect of legal neutrality and its application to intellectual property law. I then compare its implications in the patent law sphere to its potential significance in the copyright context. In Part III, I sketch an alternative approach to understanding technological neutrality and law, concerned with consistency in pursuit of normative objectives rather than formal non-discrimination between technologies. I conclude by proposing a relational approach to regulating robots, which would, I believe, bring a much-needed normative lens to the pursuit of legal neutrality.

Download the review from SSRN at the link.