Three Laws Blog: Law and Artificial Intelligence

Daly on Artificial Intelligence and Administrative Tribunals

Paul Daly, University of Ottawa, Common Law Section, has published Artificial Intelligence and Administrative Tribunals. Here is the abstract.

In this paper, I will examine the implications of artificial intelligence for administrative tribunals. I will briefly set the scene in Part I by describing the potential advantages and disadvantages of advanced technology for administrative tribunals. Although I have reservations about integrating AI into the daily operations of public administration, administrative tribunals may be a uniquely favoured site for technological experimentation. Since their origins in the 19th century the raison d’etre of administrative tribunals has been more efficient and effective decision-making. The very thing that artificial intelligence promises – efficiency and effectiveness – is exactly that which administrative tribunals have long primarily been designed to achieve. This is not to suggest, however, that administrative tribunals should move blindly forward and embrace AI in all shapes and forms. In Part I, I also suggest that careful, contextual analysis is required before using AI and lay out several typologies that are helpful in conducting the necessary analysis. In Part II, I then discuss the ways in which administrative tribunals can use AI: communicating with the public and enhancing the accessibility of their websites; assigning decisions more effectively to members of the tribunal; triaging files to ensure decisions are made as quickly as possible; drafting decisions; and, conceivably, making decisions. These use cases are set out in increasing order of audacity. Machines making websites more usable for individuals is one thing, making life-defining decisions about individual rights and obligations quite another. In the end, though, I will argue that there is a broad range of potential uses for AI in administrative tribunals.

Download the paper from SSRN at the link.

Ye, Luceri, and Ferrara on Auditing Political Exposure Bias: Algorithmic Amplification on Twitter/X Approaching the 2024 U.S. Presidential Election

Jinyi Ye, Luca Luceri, and emilio Ferrara, all of the University of Southern California, have published Auditing Political Exposure Bias: Algorithmic Amplification on Twitter/X Approaching the 2024 U.S. Presidential Election. Here is the abstract.

Approximately 50% of tweets in X's user timelines are personalized recommendations from accounts they do not follow. This raises a critical question: what political content are users exposed to beyond their established networks, and how might this influence democratic discourse online? Due to the black-box nature and constant evolution of social media algorithms, much remains unknown about this aspect of users' content exposure, particularly as it pertains to potential biases in algorithmic curation. Prior research has shown that certain political groups and media sources are amplified within users' in-network tweets. However, the extent to which this amplification affects out-of-network recommendations remains unclear. As the 2024 U.S. Election approaches, addressing this question is essential for understanding the influence of algorithms on online political content consumption and its potential impact on users' perspectives. In this paper, we conduct a three-week audit of X's algorithmic content recommendations using a set of 120 sock-puppet monitoring accounts that capture tweets in their personalized "For You" timelines. Our objective is to quantify out-of-network content exposure for right-and left-leaning user profiles and to assess any potential biases in political exposure. Our findings indicate that X's algorithm skews exposure toward a few high-popularity accounts across all users, with rightleaning users experiencing the highest level of exposure inequality. Both left-and right-leaning users encounter amplified exposure to accounts aligned with their own political views and reduced exposure to opposing viewpoints. Additionally, we observe a right-leaning bias in exposure for new accounts within their default timelines. We hope this empirical study promotes discussion on the transparency and accountability of social media algorithms, contributing to critical issues on safeguarding election integrity and fostering a more informed digital public sphere.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

Hiebaum on Some Preliminary Considerations on Legal Personhood for Nonhuman and Future Entities @c_hiebaum @UniGraz

Christian Hiebaum, University of Graz, has published Some Preliminary Considerations on Legal Personhood for Nonhuman and Future Entities as Graz Law Working Paper No. 09-2024. Here is the abstract.

Defining and allocating legal rights, and, by implication, assigning legal personhood, is one way to protect nonhuman entities (such as animals, plants, and ecosystems) and the interests of future people. This paper aims to clarify some basic issues underlying legal and legal policy debates about such protections. I shall begin with a few remarks on what legal personhood is (including a brief comparison with similar moral notions), and on two different goals when dealing with it. The bulk of the paper is devoted to three questions concerning the legal personhood of nonhuman and not yet existing entities: the analytical question, the legal question, and the legal policy question. At the end, I will briefly consider the role law may or may not play in determining moral status, rather than exploring the significance of moral status for legal and legal policy analysis.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

Brennan on Proposals for the Rights and Liabilities of Artificial Intelligence through Electronic Personhood: Conscious Machines, Hermit Crabs, and the Distant Past

Dan Brennan has published Proposals for the Rights and Liabilities of Artificial Intelligence through Electronic Personhood: Conscious Machines, Hermit Crabs, and the Distant Past. Here is the abstract.

Examines the complexities of contemporary AI regulation, chiefly in the technology's unique capacity for autonomous decision making and independent learning. The paper highlights the potential of granting legal personhood to sophisticated AI systems as an alternative to current regulatory schemes. Three categories of personhood are considered: the ontological model, corporate frameworks, and the ancient Roman concept of peculium. Fundamentally, each model allows AI to hold property and be responsible for its actions, notably by indemnifying any legal persons it may harm. That said, each model has unique benefits and limitations which are discussed in turn. Chapter 6 concludes that neither one of these models can be exclusively relied upon. Instead, a new form of 'electronic personhood' should adopt elements from all the regulatory methods discussed herein, including methods of current regulation and the EU's AI Act.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

Deeks on Delegating War Initiation to Machines @UVALaw @AustJIA

Ashley Deeks, University of Virginia School of Law, has published Delegating War Initiation to Machines at 78 Australian Journal of International Affairs 148 (2024). Here is the abstract.

The use of autonomy to initiate force, which states may begin to view as necessary to protect against hypersonic attacks and other forms of "hyperwar," may effectively constitute a delegation of war-initiation decision making to a machine. Yet legal questions about whether and when the leader of a country may delegate their decision making to others - and normative questions about whether he should do so - can be complicated. Any state that intends to introduce significant autonomy into such systems should assess whether and how the use of autonomy in war initiation comports with its domestic laws and norms that govern the delegation of the use of force.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

Haneman on The Law of Digital Resurrection @TaxLawProf @BCLawReview @CreightonLaw

Victoria J. Haneman, Creighton University School of Law, is publishing The Law of Digital Resurrection in the B. C. L. Rev. (2025). Here is the abstract.

The digital right to be dead has yet to be recognized as an important legal right. Artificial intelligence, augmented reality, and nanotechnology have progressed to the point that personal data can be used to resurrect the deceased in digital form with appearance, voice, emotion, and memory recreated to allow interaction with a digital app, chat bot, or avatar that may be indistinguishable from that with a living person. Users may now have a completely immersive experience simply by loading the personal data of the deceased into a neural network to create a chatbot that inherits features and idiosyncrasies of the deceased and dynamically learns with increased communication. There is no legal or regulatory landscape against which to estate plan to protect those who would avoid digital resurrection, and few privacy rights for the deceased. This is an intersection of death, technology, and privacy law that has remained relatively ignored until recently. This Article is the first to respect death as an important and distinguishing part of the conversation about regulating digital resurrection. Death has long had a strained relationship with the law, giving rise to dramatically different needs and idiosyncratic legal rules. The law of the dead reflects the careful balance between the power of the state and an individual's wishes, and it may be the only doctrinal space in which we legally protect remembrance. This Article frames the importance of almost half of a millennium of policy undergirding the law of the deceased, and proposes a paradigm focused upon a right of deletion for the deceased over source material (data), rather than testamentary control over the outcome (digital resurrection), with the suggestion that existing protections are likely sufficient to protect against unauthorized commercial resurrections.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

Shaheen on Section 230's Immunity for Generative Artifiicial Intelligence

Louis Shaheen, Ohio State University, has published Section 230's Immunity for Generative Artificial Intelligence. Here is the abstract.

Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 immunizes online platforms from liability resulting from the content that third parties post on their platforms. Congress passed Section 230 in response to two civil cases from New York that split on whether online platforms were immune from liability that third parties posted on their sites. Congress was concerned that, without immunity from third-party content posted on their websites, online platforms would not survive. Moreover, Congress believed that immunity was necessary for the internet's development. Congress was right. Commentators have hailed Section 230 as the backbone of the internet. But as time has passed, Section 230 has been repeatedly criticized for the broad immunity it has given platforms––immunity for conduct outside the bounds of what its drafters anticipated. With the emergence of generative artificial intelligence, Section 230 is back in the news. Congress, President Joe Biden, law firms, and law professors have begun discussing in executive orders, hearings, and law reviews whether generative artificial intelligence has Section 230 immunity. They are all concerned about the impact that artificial intelligence will have on our society. Circuit courts have not had the chance to explicitly make clear whether Section 230 immunizes generative artificial intelligence.

Download the article from SSRN at the link.

Grieman on Law, Death, and Robots: The Regulation of Artificial Intelligence in High Risk Civil Applications @hartpublishing

Forthcoming from Hart Publishing:

Keri Grieman, Law, Death, and Robots: The Regulation of Artificial Intelligence in High Risk Civil Applications (October 2024). Here from the publisher's website is a description of the book's contents.

 

Can the law keep up with AI? This book examines liability and regulation for artificial intelligence causing serious physical harm, both now and in the future. While AI moves quickly, regulation follows more slowly – an increasing problem for an evolutionary, fast-paced emerging technology. AI has the potential to save lives, but in doing so will have the potential to take them as well. How do we future-proof law and regulation to incentivise life-saving innovation as safely as possible? This book details how to regulate AI in high-risk civil applications (for example, automated vehicles and medicine), addressing both liability and regulatory structure. It highlights crucial liability themes for technology governance; provides tools to bridge the gap between regulators and technologists; examines jurisdictional approaches to AI regulation in the EU, UK, USA, and Singapore; and ultimately suggests a jurisdiction-agnostic blueprint for regulation.

Solove on A Regulatory Roadmap to AI and Privacy @DanielSolove @TeachPrivacy @gwlaw

Daniel J. Solove, George Washington University Law School, is publishing A Regulatory Roadmap to AI and Privacy as a GWU Law School Public Law Research Paper. Here is the abstract.

This short essay provides a regulatory roadmap to artificial intelligence and privacy. AI and privacy are deeply intertwined and have a complicated relationship with much overlap. AI can increase existing privacy problems, add dimensions and complexities to them, or remix them. Some attempts to regulate focus exclusively on AI, but doing this is like trying to remove weeds without digging up their roots. In stark ways, AI is showing the flaws in existing privacy laws. Instead of seeing AI as a unique situation, AI should be viewed as an opportunity to change course with privacy law generally. To address AI’s privacy problems, policymakers shouldn’t just pass new AI laws; they should also fix existing privacy laws. This essay briefly discusses the privacy problems raised by AI and how privacy law should be reformed to respond to these problems.

Download the essay from SSRN at the link.